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Mergers, hostile takeovers, plant closings, and other fundamental
corporate changes cause enormous disruption in the lives of everyone
connected with firms that experience such events. Workers, managers,
customers, suppliers, and their families are all significantly affected. Phi-
lanthropists, rival firms, and local governments also suffer significant dis-
ruption. The larger a firm is in relation to the size of the community in
which it operates, the greater the disruption any such change is likely to
have. So, for example, when the United States Steel Company closed two
steel plants in Youngstown, Ohio, it was accurate to note that:
Steel has become an institution in the Mahoning Valley ....
Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been
happening for many years because of steel. Schools have been built,
roads have been built. Expansion that has taken place is because of
steel. And to accommodate that industry, lives and destinies of in-
habitants of that community were based and planned on the basis of
that institution: Steel.'.
This Article attempts to develop a framework for thinking about the
legal treatment of various groups affected by fundamental corporate
changes. In the past, no external actors had a legal right to affect the fate
of a corporation, which, acting through its board of directors or share-
holders, could dispose of its assets in any way it wished. 2 More recently,
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1. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 618 (1988) (footnote and
citation omitted).
2. See, ag., Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.) (em-
ployer's decision to relocate did not infringe on employee's rights, since employee had no property
interest in job), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); United Steel Workers, Local No. 1330 v. United
States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (N.D. Ohio) (rejecting workers' claim to keep plant open
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however, commentators have used economic arguments about externali-
ties3 and contract-law arguments about detrimental reliance4 to claim
that firms must recognize employees' and outside entities' right to share
in decisionmaking about fundamental corporate changes. In addition, a
recent wave of state statutes now regulates the takeover process. The
ostensible justification for these statutes is protection of the economic
and political interests of non-shareholder constituencies. 5
The recent arguments in favor of plant-closing laws and restrictions
on hostile takeovers assert that non-shareholder groups suffer enormous
effects from fundamental corporate changes and generally cannot protect
themselves against the shocks caused by such events. While shareholders
can diversify their stock holdings to protect against the negative effects of
unwanted corporate changes, non-shareholders often cannot and thus re-
main particularly vulnerable to the dislocations caused by corporate re-
structuring. For all of these reasons, it is important to examine critically
how fundamental corporate changes affect non-shareholders; such an ex-
amination will help determine whether the legal system should generate
new legal rules to protect these groups.
As a starting point, it seems appropriate to assess the theoretical
underpinnings of the common law's assumptions about property rights in
corporate firms. In the past, common law courts and state corporate
codes have analyzed fundamental corporate changes solely from the
shareholder perspective, without considering how such changes affect
non-shareholder constituencies. Even though courts and legislatures
have historically neglected these constituencies, commentators have
drawn the conclusion that some alternative set of legal rules would serve
society better than the established property-rights-oriented system does.
With respect to the external effects of fundamental corporate
changes, I believe that the private contracting process, though not per-
fect, generates outcomes superior to the outcomes generated by govern-
ment regulation. This is true for five reasons. First, restrictive statutes
discourage corporate investments, ultimately harming non-shareholder
groups' interests. Because fundamental corporate changes are necessary
to preserve shareholder wealth, to redeploy underutilized corporate as-
sets, and to impose market discipline on poor management, regulation
based on management promises and employees' property rights), aff'd in part and vacated in part
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
3. See, ag, Coffee, Shareholdrs Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
?c&C. L REV. 1 (1986).
4. See ,,g., Singer, supra note 1, at 663-99.
5. See, IDAHO CODE § 30-1604 (Supp. 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397(4)
(Baldwin 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23A.50.010 (Supp. 1989).
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should encourage, not discourage, such changes. Dislocations to non-
shareholder constituencies, while real, can best be remedied by side pay-
ments, made through intrafirm contracts. Second, regulation in this area
is likely to create significant moral hazards, causing regulatory benefi-
ciaries to engage in inefficient behavior in an effort to maximize their
chances of gaining a legally recognizable claim against firms involved in
fundamental corporate changes. Third, outcomes generated by the legis-
lative process are likely to reflect the interests of well-organized special-
interest groups rather than the interests of society as a whole. Fourth,
because fundamental corporate changes lead to a diverse set of problems,
they call for the kind of particularized solutions that only private law can
yield. For all of these reasons, judges and legislatures should refrain
from creating innovative new methods of helping these non-shareholder
constituencies. Finally, even if the public-law system were likely to gen-
erate rules that faithfully serve the public interest, most proponents of
public-law solutions greatly overstate the extent to which such interven-
tion helps non-shareholder groups. Regulation forces the various con-
tracting parties involved with corporations to purchase certain rights and
sell certain obligations, resulting in Pareto-inferior allocations within
such corporations.
Modem finance theory has shown that shareholders retain plenary
authority to guide the fate of a corporate enterprise because, at the mar-
gin, they have the greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decision-
making6 and not because they hold certain ill-defined property rights.
Shareholders retain the ultimate right to control corporations because
they value this right more than do other groups and because it is there-
fore efficient for them to. retain control. Indeed, contrary to popular be-
lief, it is not particularly useful to think of corporations in terms of
property rights, since the modem theory of the firm tells us that, while
each participant in the corporate enterprise owns certain inputs (labor,
capital, machinery, inventory), the firm itself is nothing but a web of con-
tractual relationships among these various production factors. When one
views a corporation in this way, the relevant inquiry becomes not who
owns the corporation, but (1) whether these contractual arrangements
make parties to the contracts better off and, if so, (2) whether these ar-
rangements harm third (noncontracting) parties who cannot adequately
protect themselves and who, because of this harm, have legitimate claims
for legal protection.
6. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288-89
(1980).
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As this Article shows, shareholders may sometimes seek to engage
in fundamental corporate changes such as mergers and plant closings in
order to transfer wealth to themselves from other parties who have
claims on a firm's income stream. While most fundamental changes oc-
cur for sound economic reasons (such as the need to re-deploy underutil-
ized corporate assets), these changes can also allow contracting parties to
transfer wealth through opportunistic behavior. Such wealth transfers
become possible because parties make firm-specific capital investments-
including human capital investments-that can be appropriated through
a fundamental corporate change. This Article does not focus on whether
exploitation is theoretically possible-it is. The Article instead takes up
the more interesting and difficult question of which corrective mecha-
nism-the private contracting process or the public regulatory process-
can best solve the problem. The Article argues that the former choice
most effectively protects the interests of parties who have contractual
links with the corporation.
For organizational purposes, the Article divides persons affected by
fundamental corporate changes into two groups: those with preexisting
contractual relationships with a firm and those without such relation-
ships. The Article then explores the effects these changes have on each
group. It also examines each group's ability to use public law or private
contracting to solve the problems presented by fundamental corporate
changes. Part I describes current law as it affects the entities (sharehold-
ers, managers, workers, and creditors) within and outside the corporate
web of contractual relationships. Part H describes the conflicts among
parties in contractual privity with firms and shows how each party's
wealth- or security-maximizing strategies exhibit those conflicts. It re-
views the recently proposed legal solutions to the problems raised by fun-
damental corporate changes and critiques those solutions. This part also
discusses contractual parties' investments in firm-specific human capital
and looks at these parties' exposure to or engagement in behavior
designed to exploit their or others' firm-specific capital investments. Part
III describes the problems that fundamental changes impose on parties
outside a given firm and analyzes those problems in light of recent legal
scholarship arguing that outside groups, such as local governments and
philanthropists, should enjoy property rights in firms in which they have
an interest. This part concludes that recognizing such rights would harm
the very parties that the rights are supposed to protect.
I. CURRENT LAW
Unless there is an express, private agreement to the contrary, non-
shareholder constituencies have no common law property right in a cor-
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poration. While commentators have lamented the absence of such a
right,7 no judicial authority has explicitly recognized it.s Recently, how-
ever, courts and Congress have expressed a willingness to recognize non-
contract-based interests of non-shareholder constituencies. For example,
when the Denver Post faced a hostile takeover, the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that corporate directors had a responsibility to consider extrinsic
interests in deciding whether to resist: "In this case we have a corpora-
tion engaged chiefly in the publication of a large metropolitan newspaper,
whose obligation and duty is something more than the making of corpo-
rate profits. Its obligation is threefold: to the stockholders, to the em-
ployees, and to the public." 9 Such judicial approval of a board's
consideration has become almost commonplace.10 As the Delaware
Supreme Court has noted,
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judg-
ment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This
entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid
and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns
may include.., the impact on "constituencies" other than sharehold-
ers (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the com-
munity generally) .... 11
Indeed, a federal district court has stated that "[a] corporation with
a perceived threat of dismemberment of large divisions of the enterprise,
employing thousands of employees, owes substantial regard for their pen-
sion benefits, and in the case of loyal management, severance benefits." 12
According to the court, a board of directors must balance investor inter-
ests, on one hand, "and the legitimate concerns and interests of employ-
ees and management.., who service the interests of investors, on the
other." 13
7. See, eg., Singer, supra note 1, at 750-51 (recognition of new property rights would protect
those most vulnerable to economic change); cf Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations
of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contess 11 SEc. REa. L.J. 44, 72 (1983) (business judgment rule
can provide ancillary protection to third parties' interests).
8. See, eg., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1282 (6th Cit. 1980) (creation or recognition of such a right is legislative, not judicial prerogative);
Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.) (no property right in
job security), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969).
9. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972); see also id. at 1094-95.
10. See, eg., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984) (board
must have wide latitude in its decision processes); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678,
684-88 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (other entities' interests can justify use of "standstill agreement" to prevent
takeover); Block & Miller, supra note 7, at 68 (idea that firms should consider social impact of their
activities has gained wide acceptance).
11. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
12. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. Id. at 1020.
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Courts have failed to articulate a theoretical basis for providing ex-
tracontractual property rights in corporate assets, but commentators
have explored several possibilities. In particular, Professor Singer has
argued that doctrines from areas other than corporate law-such as tort
law, property law, contract law, and family law-might justify establish-
ing such rights14
Congress has followed the courts' lead in creating new property
rights for non-shareholder constituencies. For example, a controversial
new statute requires that employers with 100 or more employees give
sixty days' notice prior to certain layoffs.1 This bill gives some employ-
ees a new, inalienable right to certain corporate information. 16
Furthermore, several state statutes allow directors of a corporation
to consider how their actions affect the corporation's employees, suppli-
ers, and customers, as well as the communities in which the corpora-
tions's facilities are located.17 A few states add that directors, in
discharging their duties, may consider the economy of the state and the
nation.18
In the context of the market for corporate control, Ohio requires
bidders to file details about the anticipated effect of their acquisitions on
employment, general economic activity, and tax revenues; other states
permit boards of directors to take such factors into account when consid-
ering how to respond to an outside bid.19 Although a federal court re-
cently held the Ohio statute unconstitutional on commerce clause
grounds,20 the statute illustrates a growing trend among state legislatures
to allow (or even require) corporations to consider the interests of parties
14. Singer, supra note 1, at 621.
15. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, §§ 2(a), 3, 102
Stat. 890, 890, 891 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2102).
16. This non-contract-based right to advance notice of layoffs also found a place in the 1988
Democratic Party platform. See Excerpts From the Democratic Platform: A Revival of Hop, N.Y.
Times, July 20, 1988, at A20, coL. 1 ("advance notice of [layoffs] is not only fundamentally right but
also economically sound").
17. See, e., ILL. ANN. STATph. 32, pars. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1988);, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (1964 & Supp. 1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989);, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon
Supp. 1989);, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Supp. 1988); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)
(Amderson Supp. 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8363-8364 (Purdon 1987); Wts. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.305 (West Supp. 1988).
18. See, e-g, MNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D); OMO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.59.
19. See Ohio Foreign Business Acquisition Act, No. S. 359, sec. 1, § 1710.03, 1988 Ohio Legis.
Bull. 42,43 (Anderson) (effective Feb. 12, 1988), repealed by & secs. 2-3, 1988 Ohio Legis. Bull. at
43 (repeal in same enactment, effective July 1, 1988); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (al-
lowing directors to consider non-shareholder interests when they decide whether "the continued
independence of [a] corporation" is desirable).
20. Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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with which they have no contractual ties.21
II. FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES: THE INTERESTS OF
THOSE IN CONTRACTUAL PRivITy WITH A FIRM
In classic articles that reshaped our conception of the corporate en-
terprise, Alchian and Demsetz22 and Jensen and Meckling 23 articulated a
vision of the corporation as a team of inputs organized under a set of
related contractual arrangements. In 1980, Eugene Fama further ad-
vanced our understanding of the corporation when he abandoned "the
typical presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful
sense." 24 In claiming that the concept of firm ownership is irrelevant,
Fama observed that the large corporation's central identifying feature is
separation of the management function from the risk-bearing function,
and he emphasized contract rather than legal metaphysics as the proper
basis for understanding that structure.
Embedded within the view that a corporation is simply a net of in-
terdependent contractual relationships is the idea that the same con-
tracting process that creates a corporation in the first place determines
the precise terms of these legal relationships. For this reason, the theory
of the firm implies that the law should respect the legal arrangements
accepted by those within the firm. In other words, the theory of the firm
recognizes the benefits of private ordering.
As the following discussion shows, the contracting process that cre-
ates a corporation is capable of addressing the difficulties raised by the
prospect of fundamental corporate change. The theory of the firm im-
plies that the various participants in a corporate enterprise will trade
rights and obligations among themselves, taking account of their respec-
tive skills and abilities as well as the corporation's needs. Within every
successful enterprise, a complex bargaining process allows rights to be
"sold" to those who value them the most. The corporation's charter,
bylaws, and, to some extent, the laws of the situs in which the corpora-
21. See eg., KY. REv. STAT. A.,N. § 271B.12-210 (4) (Baldwin Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.251(5); cf. IDAHO CODE § 30-1604 (Supp. 1988) (state considers extracontractual enti-
ties and their interests when regulating business combinations); NJ. STAT. A-N.. § 14A:10A-2 (West
Supp. 1988) (same); TE N. CODE ANN. § 48-35-202(2) (1988) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 23A.50.010 (Supp. 1989) (same).
22. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 62 Am.
ECON. REv. 777, 794 (1972).
23. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firthm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FID. ECON. 305 (1976) (integrating "elements from the theory of agency, the theory of
property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the
firm").
24. See Fama, supra note 6, at 289.
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tion chooses to incorporate, reflect the precise outcome of this process.
The allocation of rights and obligations will vary from firm to firm, de-
pending on a multitude of factors, such as the various claimants' risk
preferences, the contracting parties' relative bargaining power, and the
nature of the expected returns on the firm's assets.
In light of these realities, legal rules that purport to "protect" non-
contracting parties from the effects of fundamental corporate change
often simply rearrange relationships previously agreed to by the parties
involved with a firm. These rules tend to reduce the overall value of
firms that must comply with them. For example, if a legislature unilater-
ally gives rank-and-file workers a right to prior notification of a layoff or
plant closing, the workers will benefit only if, to retain that right, they
will not have to give up something worth more than the right itself. The
price of the forced "purchase" of a right to notification may take the
form of lower wages, reduced pension benefits, or a reduction in the over-
all size of the workforce. Similarly, we can easily see why employees do
not bargain for rights to assume control of their employers' firms when
the firms become insolvent: such rights would give workers a strong in-
centive to drive their employers' firms into insolvency and thus would
carry a considerable cost.
From the perspective of a firm as a whole, legal rules that purport to
redefine specific details of arrangements among corporate actors might
make all parties worse off because such rules prevent the parties from
receiving the benefits of bargains to which they had previously agreed.
The law should seek to protect, rather than undermine, these contract
arrangements. With respect to laws regulating fundamental corporate
changes, this means that courts should (1) seek to discover the nature of
the implicit contracts among the various parties that make up a firm, (2)
police ex post contractual opportunism by parties seeking to exploit the
firm-specific capital investments made by others, and (3) respect the spe-
cial needs of shareholders as residual claimants.
While all interested p -ties might appear to bear the risk that a cor-
poration will do poorly, shareholders are unique because they hold varia-
ble claims to a firm's income stream. Unlike bondholders and
employees, shareholders do not negotiate compensation schedules in ad-
vance of performance. Rather, shareholders bear the costs of abnormally
good or bad corporate performance because they receive compensation
only after fixed claims are paid.25
The differing interests of fixed claimants and shareholders inevitably
lead to conflict. In assessing how the legal system should deal with fun-
25. Easterbrook & FhscheL Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395, 403 (1983).
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damental corporate changes, we must take up the delicate task of deter-
mining the nature of the implicit contract between fixed claimants and
shareholders.
A. Intrafirm Conflicts and the Implicit Corporate Contract
The most important manifestation of the conflict of interest between
fixed claimants and shareholders lies in their attitudes toward the opti-
mal level of risk that a firm should take.26 Shareholders have a powerful
incentive to induce their firms to engage in activities that fixed claimants
would consider excessively risky.27 This is because shareholders stand to
reap all of the benefits from the spectacular success of a particularly risky
activity, but stand to lose only the amount of their initial capital invest-
ment.28 Fixed claimants, in contrast, do no better when their firm per-
forms very well than when their firm garners only a moderate return. 29
For this reason, shareholders generally retain the right to control most
details of a firm's business, subject to the broad contractual protections
that fixed claimants extract to protect themselves against default.
As Professor Coffee has recently pointed out, this conflict between
shareholders and fixed claimants becomes even more acute when a firm is
on the brink of insolvency.3° In such cases, shareholders will gain noth-
ing from the returns on a conservative investment, which fixed claimants
alone will enjoy. The shareholders will prefer investments that are
"much riskier" but offer the "possibility, albeit remote, of a bonanza pay-
26. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 334-35.
27. This is not meant to suggest that shareholders always prefer risky investments to conserva-
tive ones, or that shareholders as'a group have a greater tolerance for risk than do fixed claimants as
a group. Rather, within the confines of any particular firm, shareholders will prefer that the firm
assume greater levels of risk than will fixed claimants. As Cliff Smith and Jerold Warner have
observed:
If a firm sells bonds for the stated purpose of engaging in low variance [i.e., low-risk]
projects and the bonds are valued at prices commensurate with that low risk, the value of
the stockholders' equity rises and the bondholders' claim is reduced by substituting
projects which increase the firm's variance rate.
Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenans 7 J. FIm. Eco.. 117,
118-19 (1979) (footnotes omitted) (describing various mechanisms that fixed claimants use to control
this conflict through intrafirm contracting process); see also W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSIN-ESS
ORGAN-IZATION AND FINM'CE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 25-30 (3d ed. 1988) (illustrat-
ing shareholders' and fixed claimants' conflicting risk preferences and observing that "[firom any
starting point, holding the total market value of the firm and of all securities constant, a decision that
shifts investments in such a way as to increase ... risk will result in an increase in the value of the
common and a decrease in the value of the bonds").
28. For a useful numerical example of how shareholders can shift wealth to themselves from
fixed claimants such as bondholders, see W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 27, at 26-27.
29. Shareholders' ability to diversify their investments exacerbates the conflict between share-
holders and fixed claimants.
30. Coffee, supra note 3, at 61.
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off that will prevent insolvency.131
The potential policy problem, of course, is that shareholders will,
using their control over a corporation, shift resources from safe invest-
ments to risky investments in order to transfer wealth from fixed claim-
ants to themselves. 32 Shareholders sometimes use fundamental corporate
changes to increase risk in this way. Such restructuring consistently
leads to increased debt levels, and this leverage not only increases firm
risk, but also increases shareholders' appetite for risk.3 3 The increased
number of fundamental corporate changes in recent years has benefitted
shareholders at the expense of managers, an important species of fixed
claimants. The fact that shareholders have an incentive to effectuate
such transfers suggests a need for intrafirm contracting devices to miti-
gate this potential problem.34
Rational fixed claimants should recognize that, from their perspec-
tive, shareholders' risk-taking proclivities are excessive. When managers
price a new bond issue or other form of fixed claim, fixed claimants will
make judgments about the expected behavior of equity claimants and ad-
just the price they pay for their fixed claims to compensate themselves for
the prospect that shareholders will make subsequent wealth transfers. 35
Thus, shareholders, not fixed claimants, will internalize the costs of any
anticipated excessive risk taking.
The structure of the large, publicly held firm prevents shareholders
from increasing firm risk. Managers of such firms have economic inter-
ests in their firms that are analogous to the interests of other fixed claim-
ants. Managers receive much of their compensation in fixed payments;
they thus wish to avoid risk in order to preserve the expected value of
their fixed claims. Although parties could design managerial compensa-
31. Id
32. See Smith & Warner, supra note 27, at 118-19. The exchange of low-risk assets for high-
risk assets does not decrease a firm's overall value as long as the combined net present value of all
assets held by the firm remains the same. Note, however, that "stockholders will have incentives to
purchase projects with negative net resent values if the increase in the firm's variance rate from
accepting those prcjects is sufficiently large. Even though such projects reduce the total value of the
firm, the value of the equity rises." Id at 119 n.4; see ais Macey & Miller, Bank Failures Risk
.Monitoring and the Market for Bank ControL 88 COLUM. L REv. 1153, 1162-65 (1988) (explaining
shareholder/fixed claimant conflict as it affects fixed claimants who are depositors in federally in-
sured banks. and showing how shareholders of such banks can transfer wealth to themselves by
causing banks to shift to investments that not only increase variance but also decrease banks' overall
value).
33. Costs of failure increasingly fall on fixed claimants as firm leverage increases.
34. Of course, developing such intrafirm contracts involves costs, and shareholders and fixed
claimants will have an incentive to write contracts that constrain shareholders only as long as the
expected gain from such contracts exceeds the tansaction and information costs associated with the
contracting process.
35. Smith & Warner, supra note 27, at 119.
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tion plans to align the interests of shareholders and managers, 36 such
plans would fail to solve these managerial risk-avoidance problems. As
Irwin Friend and Larry Lang argued in a recent article, the desire of
managers to reduce both the volatility of share prices and the likelihood
of insolvency motivates capital structure decisions.37 Specifically, Friend
and Lang studied 984 publicly or closely held firms whose stock traded
on the New York Stock Exchange between 1979 and 1983.38 Friend and
Lang found that high levels of debt (and hence greater risk) correlated
with high levels of managerial stock ownership. Similarly, firms whose
principal stockholders were not managers tended to assume greater levels
of risk.39 These findings agree with other empirical work showing that
management-controlled firms retain a higher percentage of earnings than
other firms.4 Higher retained earnings, of course, give managers and
other fixed claimants greater security.
Managers' investment preferences also differ from shareholders' be-
cause managers' investments, unlike shareholders', are largely nondiver-
sifiable. Managers' investments come in the form of human capital
allocations4' and thus diversification is impossible: managers work for
only one firm at a time. This difference makes it particularly costly to
write contracts that effectively link management and shareholder inter-
ests about risk taking.42 Thus, shareholders have few means of protect-
36. Cf E. LAZEAR, INcElNrvE CoNrRAcTs (1986) (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 1917) (discussing various ways for employers to induce an employee to work
effectively).
37. Friend & Lang, An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate
Capital Structure, 43 J. FIN. 271, 272 (1988).
38. Id. at 280.
39. Id.
40. Williamson, ManagerialDiscretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 1032, 1047-
51(1963).
41. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 17 & n.42.
42. Stock ownership, stock option plans, and compensation plans that link management com-
pensation with firm performance all serve to align shareholders' and managers' interests. See Easter-
brook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare Theories and Evidence 9 D1rL. J. CORP. L. 540,
557-62 (1984). Easterbrook points to empirical studies showing: (1) that "for the top managers of
the largest firms, the after-tax value of ... stock-based compensation was three to five times the
after-tax value of... other compensation," id. at 559; (2) that stock-based compensation dominated
other forms of remuneration for the managers of 29 large conglomerates in 1970-1975, iL at 560,
and (3) that "about 65 percent of the variance in total executive compensation can be explained by
differences in the firms' return on assets," id at 561. But see Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, the
Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the Special Case of Remedies. 53 BROOKLYN L. REv.
919, 944 (1988) (citing working paper by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy showing that "the
typical chief executive officer's salary plus bonuses changes less than two cents for every thousand
dollar's change in the equity value of the firm").
It is relatively easy to devise managerial compensation plans that link managerial compensation
to firm performance. Such plans can cause managers' time horizons for decisionmaking to coincide
better with shareholders' time horizons for evaluating their investments, can reduce the incidence of
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ing themselves other than by discounting the price they pay for shares of
firms in which managers own little stock.43 This solution to the manage-
rial risk-avoidance problem, however, impedes the capital formation
process.
Fundamental corporate changes reflect a market-based solution to
the problem of excessive risk-avoidance. In particular, "bust-up" take-
overs, financed by junk bonds, increase the leverage of target firms, in-
crease risk, and benefit shareholders.44 Some commentators, particularly
Professor Coffee, have recognized this phenomenon and have condemned
it:
[The hostile takeover can be seen not simply as a mechanism that
compels management to accept that level of business risk that share-
holders deem appropriate, but as a means by which shareholders out-
flank the safeguards managers obtained to protect the promises of
deferred compensation and job security that shareholders have given to
managers. Thus, what appears from the bidder's perspective to be a
process of purging organizational slack looks from the manager's view-
point more like deceptive reneging on the original understanding.45
managerial shirking, and can reduce the costs of renegotiating managers' contracts. Smith & Watts,
Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans, 7 AUSM. J. MGMr. 139, 144-47 (1982).
Managers' excessive risk aversion makes it far more complicated, however, to devise a compen.
sation strategy that aligns shareholders' and managers' interests. The studies cited by Easterbrook
all increase rather than decrease the portion of managerial human capital that is linked to firm
performance ex ante. As a consequence, while these compensation arrangements may give managers
an incentive to avoid shirking in some respects, they make firm failure more costly to managers-
both in terms of actual costs and in terms of opportunity costs.
To put it another way, any mechanism for aligning managers' and shareholders' preferences for
risk taking would have to provide compensation for managers who invest in projects that fail. The
managerial compensation plans described above reward managers for investing in projects that suc-
ceed. While there may be benefits to shareholders who compensate managers who invest in projects
that fail, there are costs as well, and, at least so far, shareholders are taking the view that the costs of
writing such contracts outweigh the benefits.
Managers can diversify their human capital investments by engaging in conglomerate mergers.
Commentators have argued that such mergers were popular in the 1960s and 1970s because manag-
ers were attempting to garner the benefits of diversification. See Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a
Managerial Motivefor Conglomeratelfergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 605 (1981).
43. Cf W. McEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 39-50 (1975) (review-
ing several studies showing that firms with a separation of share ownership and managerial control
will have lower return on investment than firms that shareholders control); Baumol, Heim, Malkel
& Quandt, Efficiency of Corporate Investmen" Reply, 55 REV. ECON. & STATS. 128, 131 (1973)
(firms had extremely low rates of return on projects financed through retained earnings). As Profes-
sor Coffee has pointed out, these studies indicate that managers are "overly biased toward earnings
retention." Coffee, supra note 3, at 22.
44. See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
11 (1987). Increasing leverage increases residual claimants' expected rate of return. It also increases
the variance of expected outcomes, and thus increases firm risk. W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note
27, at 285-86.
45. Coffee, supra note 3, at 24.
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This perspective assumes that shareholders have somehow promised
managers that they will refrain from engaging in excessive risk taking
and that fundamental corporate changes such as takeovers are thus noth-
ing but postcontractual opportunism by shareholders. These assump-
tions are untenable. Once managers know that a firm "ha[s] entered the
era of the two-tier, front-end-loaded, bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond take-
over,""6 they can demand compensation packages that protect them from
the vagaries of the market for corporate control. In other words, the
argument that managers somehow deserve protection from takeovers
that increase firm risk makes sense only if managers are unaware that the
market for corporate control can cause a firm's capital structure to reflect
shareholder interests. Once managers have that information, they ought
to be able to forge protective agreements with shareholders. Shackling
the market for corporate control when managers and shareholders have
the same information about the possibility of takeovers will only lead to
misallocations of investment capital and inefficient capital structures.
Thus, the only management groups who potentially deserve protec-
tion are those who erroneously took their positions while thinking that
they would be able to engage in risk-avoidance strategies that would de-
crease their firms' expected earnings below the level of similar firms who
have either a high proportion of institutional shareholders or heavy in-
sider holdings. Yet, even this expectation seems unreasonable, because
over time one would expect such firms to founder in competitive markets
because of higher costs. This fact leaves it unclear whether the legal sys-
tem should respect managers' expectations that they can enjoy the bene-
fits of risk avoidance at shareholders' expense, since managers have an
overarching duty to maximize their firm's value for shareholders.
The theory that managers can legitimately expect to avoid risk be-
comes even more dubious when we look at the costs of risk avoidance.
The current takeover boom stems from a gross disparity between the
stock values and the asset values of U.S. firms.47 This disparity has ena-
bled bidders to offer shareholders in target companies substantial average
premiums-for example, 33.6% in 1986-over current market prices.48
It is simply inconceivable that managers and shareholders would agree
that managers' job security is worth over a third of the value of every
firm in America.
The fact that takeovers have long been a part of corporate life makes
the notion that shareholders have implicitly agreed to give managers pro-
46. Lipton, Takeover Abuses Mortgage the Future, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 16, col. 4.
47. Coffee, supra note 3, at 8.
48. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Controk The Empirical Evidence
Since 1980, J. ECON. PEaSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 52.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tection from takeovers doubly implausible. For example, in the 1960s,
prior to the passage of the Williams Act, America experienced a massive
takeover wave.49 Since that wave, managers have seen the takeover or
restructuring of numerous competitiors, suppliers, and customers; this
information justifies holding managers responsible if they have failed to
negotiate employment contracts to compensate them for the possibility of
takeover.
Indeed, even if managers could not have anticipated the possibility
of fundamental corporate changes, their lack of foresight should not em-
power them to obstruct new mechanisms that enhance shareholder
wealth. The implicit contract between shareholders and managers estab-
lishes that managers have a duty "to make corporate decisions so as to
maximize the value of [their] company's shares." 5 This widely recog-
nized point stems from the fact that shareholders are residual claimants
to an enterprise's value.51 Thus, the argument that fundamental corpo-
rate changes reflect a "deceptive reneging" 52 on the original contract be-
tween shareholders and managers is a problematic one. The better
argument is that, while the market for corporate control "benefit[s]
shareholders," it also "mak[es] life more uncomfortable for top level ex-
ecutives" who are not satisfying the implicit terms of their employment
agreements with shareholders. 53
The law should permit managers to negotiate employment agree-
ments that compensate them for increased risks. Golden parachutes, or
severance contracts that compensate managers if they lose their jobs in
the event of a change in control, allow managers to obtain protection
against such changes. They reduce the conflict of interest between share-
holders and managers during takeovers and permit the huge gains assoc-
iated with such fundamental corporate changes to be realized. 5' The
value of golden parachutes is clear: firms that provide managers with
such benefits enjoy an average increase of approximately three percent in
share value.55 In addition, a wealth of empirical evidence shows that
compensation packages th4 tie managerial performance to share prices
49. Romano, The Future of Hastile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. QN. L.
REv. 457,458-60 & tbL 1 (1988) (correlating antitakeover laws with increased antitakeover activity).
50. R CIMAC, CoipoixTe LAW 17-18 (1986).
51. Id at 17, 18; see also supra text accompanying note 25.
52. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 24.
53. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences . ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 21,
45.
54. Id at 39.
55. See Lambert & Larcker, Golden Parachutes Executive Decision-Making and Shareholder
Wealth, 7 . Accr. & ECON. 179, 194-95 (1985) (securities performance of firms sampled over 16-
day per d).
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and other measures of firm performance are common. 56 These contrac-
tual provisions compensate managers for the possibility that they will
lose their jobs through corporate restructuring.
Because no secondary market in managerial employment contracts
exists, information on how fundamental corporate changes affect the
value of such contracts is hard to obtain. As mentioned above, however,
managers' interests resemble those of fixed claimants such as bondhold-
ers, whose interests are actively traded in the financial markets. 57 If fun-
damental corporate changes do not transfer wealth from bondholders to
shareholders, they seem extremely unlikely to transfer wealth from man-
agers to shareholders, since managers are better able than bondholders to
negotiate with shareholders. Unlike other fixed claimants, managers can
renegotiate their compensation packages every year. In addition, manag-
ers control the corporate proxy machinery and, through it, the board of
directors. These powers put managers in a better position than other
fixed claimants to protect themselves from opportunistic shareholders
who try to increase firm risk.
By observing the effect of takeovers on the value of fixed financial
claims such as bonds, we can assess the argument that corporate control
transactions adversely affect managers. Empirical evidence indicates that
takeover activity does not harm fixed claimants; indeed, some groups of
fixed claimants actually benefit from such activity.58 For example, a
56. See Antle & Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of
Corporate Executives, 24 J. Accr. REs. 1 (1986); Benson, The Self-Serving Management Hypothesir
Some Evidenca 7 J. Accr. & ECON. 67, 82 (1985), Coughlan & Schmidt, Executive Compensation
Management Tunover, and Firm Performancec An Empirical Investigation, 7 J. Accr. & ECON. 43,
43 (1985); Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis
7 J. Accr. & EcoN. 11, 20-22 (1985); Murphy, Incentives Learning and Compensation A Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts 17 RAND J. ECON. 59, 60-64 (1986);
P. Kostiuk, Executive Ability, Corporate Performance, and Managerial Income (May 1986) (pre-
pared by Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Va.).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
58. Not all intrafirm transactions benefit fixed claimants. The recent increase in large leveraged
buyout transactions (such as the $17.7 billion deal announced by RJR Nabisco in September, 1988)
caused dramatic declines in bond prices. See Winkler, Harris; Williams Co to Offer Bonds with
"Poison Puts," Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1988, at Cl, col. 1. These transactions dramatically increase the
amount of debt held by the firms that engage in them. This increase in leverage increases firms' risk
levels and raises the probability of default, thereby lowering the market value of such firms' previ-
ously outstanding bonds. The reduced equity cushion brought about by these leveraged buyouts
places further downward pressure on the value of the bonds.
But, consistent with the arguments presented in this Article, market forces have been quick to
formulate a response to this new phenomenon. Proposed new debt issues, such as the S100,000,000
in debentures to be offered by The First Boston Corporation and Salomon Brothers on behalf of
Northwest Pipeline Corporation, have included so-called "poison put" provisions, which contain
covenants that effectively protect holders of the debentures from the increased risk associated with
leveraged buyouts. Northwest Pipeline Corp., Prospectus 15-16 (Nov. 1988) (on file in offices of the
Duke Law Journal). These poison put provisions require the company to either: (I) redeem the
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study of 132 mergers that took place between 1962 and 1980 showed that
holders of merging firms' convertible and nonconvertible preferred stock,
as well as holders of convertible bonds, actually gained from such trans-
actions.59 Other fixed claimants, such as holders of nonconvertible
bonds, neither gain nor lose from fundamental corporate changes. This
point is consistent with another study showing that fixed claimants can
contract to protect themselves from shareholders' opportunism. 6° Bond-
holders can also protect themselves by buying shares and by diversifying
their debt portfolios. Fixed claimants thus can use contractual devices
for dealing with shareholders' attempted wealth transfers. If bondhold-
ers can protect themselves from the possibility that shareholders will
goad firms into taking excessive risks, managers ought to be able to do so
as well.
B. Investments in Firm-Specific Human Capital
While managers can easily protect themselves from shareholders'
tastes for high levels of risk, the inability of managers, workers, custom-
ers, and suppliers to diversify their firm-specific capital investments poses
a far heavier burden on the contracting process. Commentators, particu-
larly the ubiquitous Professor Coffee, have argued that transactions such
as hostile takeovers represent shareholder appropriation of firm-specific
investments that are made by a firm's managers, workers, customers, and
suppliers. 61
Appropriation of a firm-specific capital investment stems from the
existence of an appropriable quasi-rent. 62 Appropriable quasi-rents arise
debentures at 100 percent of their outstanding principal amount within five days of the occurrence of
a "designated event" and a "qualifying downgrade"; or (2) adjust the interest rate paid to the deben-
ture holders in a manner that will compensate them for any increased risk when there is a designated
event and a qualifying downgrade. Id
A "designated event" consists of. (I) a merger or transfer of all or substantially all of the firm's
assets to another firm; (2) any change or exchange of a majority of the common stock of the com-
pany; (3) any purchase or acquisition by any person of 30% or more of the firm's common stock; (4)
a purchase by the firm or one of its V.bsidiaries of 30% or more of its own common stock or (5) a
similar transaction at the holding company level. Id A "qualifying downgrade" occurs ifthe rating
on the bonds by Standard & Poor's Corporation is at least BBB twenty days prior to the occurrence
of a designated event, and subsequently falls to less than BBB, or if the rating on the bonds by
Moody's Investors Services, Inc. is at least Baa3 twenty days prior to the occurence of a designated
event and subsequently falls to less than Baa3. Id at 16.
59. Dennis & McConnell, Corporate Mergers and Security Returns, 16 . FIN. ECON. 143, 185
(1986).
60. Smith and Warner, supra note 27.
61. Coffee, supra note 3, at 24. Coffee's arguments are confined to managers' investment of
firm-specific human capital, but his argument can easily be extended to include other parties with
contractual interests in a firm undergoing a fundamental corporate change.
62. The classic treatment of this subject is Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 299 (1978).
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when an asset is so specialized to a particular user, or so expensive to
remove, that even if the asset's owner could arrange a sale of the asset at
a reduced price, high costs would prevent the owner from transferring
the asset to other users.63
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian illustrate the notion of a firm-specific
capital investment with an example from the automobile industry. 64
They point out that the giant presses used for stamping out auto body
parts are customized to the design and engineering specifications of par-
ticular cars. After customization takes place, manufacturers of these
presses are unable to sell the enormously expensive devices to other
firms. In addition, buying these presses involves a huge initial (sunk)
cost but only a small incremental (operating) cost. The danger, then, is
that an auto manufacturer will act opportunistically by reneging on its
initial contract to buy a press from a press owner. The auto manufac-
turer could do this by feigning some reason to renegotiate the contract,
such as claiming that the auto industry is depressed. 65 Such behavior is
difficult for courts to detect. If an auto manufacturer were inclined to
engage in such behavior, it might pay the owner of the press only for the
small marginal costs of operating the press and appropriate the press
owner's huge sunk investment in the original construction of the press.
On the other hand, if the auto manufacturer could not find an alternative
source for body parts, the press owner might be able to exploit the auto
manufacturer. 66
This section of the Article examines the opportunities for such ex-
ploitative behavior at various levels of a corporation experiencing funda-
mental corporate change. Managers, bondholders, suppliers, customers,
and rank-and-file workers all face risks of expropriation, since all of them
make firm-specific capital investments.
1. Corporate Management and Bondholders. A corporate em-
ployee makes a firm-specific human capital investment when he invests
time and energy acquiring the job skills and training that apply only to
his firm. In addition, firms may have unique patterns of communication
"necessitat[ing] that special interpersonal skills be acquired to function in
individual corporate environments." 67
Corporate managers make such firm-specific human capital invest-
ments in their firms. But the existence of such investments does not inev-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 308-10.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Coffee, supra note 3, at 17 n.42 (citations omitted).
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itably give shareholders opportunities to exploit managers. In fact, given
that such firm-specific investments enhance shareholder wealth, share-
holders may not have any greater potential for committing exploitive
conduct than managers have.
Suppose, for example, that a manager sets out to obtain technical
skills or communication abilities that will be specific to her firm. Sup-
pose further that these firm-specific skills will increase the value of her
firm by $1,000,000. Bargaining between the manager and the firm will
allocate this $1,000,000 between firm and manager. If the manager and
the firm split the gains fifty-fifty, the manager receives an increase in pay
with a present value of $500,000, and the value of the firm's shares in-
creases by a total of $500,000 (if we assume that there are 500,000 shares
outstanding, the value of each share will increase by $1.00). Such a situa-
tion gives shareholders or outside bidders no opportunity to exploit the
manager who makes this investment.
If the manager is fired, the firm's value will decline by $500,000: the
firm will gain $500,000 by firing the manager, because a replacement can
be hired for $500,000 less, but the firm will lose the $1,000,000 increase
in value that the manager's investment brought to the firm, resulting in a
net decline of $500,000. Thus, because firing the manager and locating a
replacement involves substantial costs, shareholders or acquirers of the
firm are not likely to fire her. In addition, if the firm has already paid the
manager some of the promised $500,000, it will not be able to recoup this
sum when it fires her. As a consequence, as time goes on and the man-
ager has captured a larger and larger portion of the payments owed to
her for making her investment, the firm's incentive for firing her declines.
If the firm's payments to the manager track the increases in the
firm's value, then the manager will be able to exploit the firm, since if she
quits, the firm's value will decline by the full $1,000,000, while the man-
ager will still capture the full value of her investments. The limiting case
is where the manager gets her entire $500,000 as soon as she finishes
making her human capital investment. In this case, she can threaten to
leave, and, since she has already captured all of the increase to which she
is entitled, the firm has no way of retaliating against her. Thus, share-
holders or tender offerors can exploit a manager who has made a firm-
specific human capital investment only when the manager has made such
an investment but has not yet received compensation for it.
Such situations may not arise very often, and it is not obvious why
managers cannot contract to protect themselves from such exploitation.
Just as firms and bidders can appropriate firm-specific human capital in-
vestments made by managers, so too can managers appropriate the
payouts that firms make in exchange for such investments. Indeed,
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shareholders probably need this protection more than managers do. Be-
cause .managers should fully understand the increase in firm value that
comes as a result of their investments, as well as the importance of the
timing of those investments, they should be able to extract ex ante
promises from their firms to compensate them for the investments they
make. 68
2. Customers and Suppliers The arguments made above for
managers and bondholders apply with even greater force to fixed claim-
ants such as customers and suppliers. These parties can structure their
contractual relationships with firms to solve the problem of shareholders'
opportunistic behavior. Customers and suppliers make firm-specific in-
vestments not only in the form of human capital, but also in the form of
fixed capital investments in specialized assets. As Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian point out, however, long-term contractual arrangements (up to
and including outright vertical integration) can eradicate the threat of
postcontractual opportunism by either party.69
3. Rank-and-File Worker& While it might seem that the
problems faced by rank-and-fie workers match those faced by managers,
important differences exist. Unlike high-level managers, who make firm-
specific human capital investments as individuals, rank-and-file workers
are often trained as groups and make firm-specific human capital invest-
ments simultaneously with their co-workers. This arrangement contains
additional potential for exploitation, because firms enjoy economies of
scale in hiring and trainiig workers.70 Suppose, for example, that tele-
phone operators for a particular phone company require certain special-
ized skills, and that the phone company trains 100 unskilled workers for
50 positions. The workers' opportunity cost during their training time is
$7.00 per hour (their alternative wage as unskilled laborers), and their
marginal value to the phone company after their training is $25.00 per
hour. Suppose further that these workers require a one-year training pe-
riod, during which they are paid only $5.00 per hour, with a promise of
68. A large investment in human capital may result in only a negligible payoff for the firm in
which it is made. In such cases, the firm will be able to "exploit" managers by firing them before
fully compensating them for their human capital investments. But even here, it is not at all obvious
why intrafirm contracts cannot handle the risk that the human capital investment will not produce
tangible benefits for the firm.
69. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 62, at 300, 302.
70. See Schleifer & Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 41-42, 49 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988) (arguing that raiders
can exploit implicit long-term contracts between workers and managers by eliminating the managers
committed to the contracts and breaching them so as to effect a transfer of contract wealth from
workers to shareholders).
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receiving an hourly wage of $12.50 at the end of the training period. At
the end of the training period the phone company can exploit the work-
ers by forcing them to renegotiate their contracts. The workers may be
inclined to settle for some amount less than the $12.50 they were origi-
nally promised (but greater than the $7.00 opportunity cost of their
time), because they recognize that the $2.00 per hour in earnings they
have given up during their training period is sunk. If, as might be ex-
pected, the initial promise of the higher salary is contingent on a positive
evaluation of each worker by the company, the possibility of exploitation
becomes palpable.
This scenario has prompted commentators to argue that takeovers
and other fundamental corporate changes come at labor's expense. 71 The
following subsections show that neither theoretical analysis nor empirical
evidence supports this argument.
a. The theoretical analysis. Takeovers, bankruptcy, and other
fundamental corporate changes have been widely criticized as a method
of exploiting workers by forcing them to renegotiate their contracts. 72
An employer's need to maintain its reputation in its community and to
attract new workers in the future will tend to discourage this sort of ex-
ploitation. In addition, as a theoretical matter, workers can solve this
problem by forming a union to ensure that they will not be treated op-
portunistically. If, in the above example, a union gives workers the abil-
ity to appropriate the capital investment made by the phone company,
those workers no longer face the additional problems created by the col-
lective nature of their training, and we return to the bilateral situation
described above.7 3 In this context, the legal system need only protect the
terms of contractual arrangements to which parties have previously
agreed. In addition, firms' ability to exploit unions does not clearly ex-
ceed unions' ability to exploit firms. For both entities, the threat of a loss
of reputation from refusals to act in good faith provides a strong incen-
tive to refrain from opportunistic behavior.74 Beyond these generalities,
71. See id at 42-43. Recent takeovers in the airline industry have seemed particularly vulnera-
ble to this argument. See Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 48, at 57.
72. See P,&, 3 D. CoWANS, BANKxRuTcY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.13, at 326 (1987) (in
1970s, airlines attempted to repudiate collective bargaining agreements by "running" to bankruptcy
court);, Comment, From Legislation to Consternation: Has Section 1113 Really Changed Bildisco?, 12
DEL. L CoRp. L 167, 167-68 (1987) (prior to enactment of § 1113, union officials feared onslaught
of ersatz bankruptcies to terminate unwanted collective bargaining agreements); Note, Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. Rv. 983,
987 (1985) (bankruptcy procedures permitting unilateral termination of collective bargaining agree-
ments allow employer to commit unfair labor practices).
73. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
74. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 62, at 314.
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particular problems require detailed (and costly) contractual solutions.
Public-law solutions prove unsuitable in this setting, because each
case presents unique problems. Consider, for example, a statute pro-
scribing "appropriation of firm-specific human capital investments of any
type." Applying such a statute would present problems in identifying the
investments made in individual cases and in determining whether the
party making those investments was compensated according to the origi-
nal contract. Courts would face the difficult task of distinguishing ex
post contractual opportunism from legitimate renegotiations in light of
unforeseen circumstances.
The closing of steel mills in Youngstown, Ohio, presents a well-
known example of a fundamental corporate change and its effects. An
employee union and the city of Youngstown sued to prevent the United
States Steel Corporation from closing two mills.7 The above discussion
indicates that a key issue in the case should have been whether employees
had made a firm-specific human capital investment in the mills--an in-
vestment that they could not have easily transferred to another job. Ab-
sent such a human capital investment, U.S. Steel should have had no
incentive to engage in exploitative behavior. In cases where such invest-
ments exist, however, courts should be sensitive to the possibility of op-
portunistic behavior by plant owners.76 The presence of a union,
however, should mitigate appropriation of workers' firm-specific
investments.
Duncan Kennedy has argued that the Youngstown case was
wrongly decided and that the court should have conveyed the plant to
the union "in trust for the present workers."' 77 Kennedy asserts that the
employees failed to bargain for and obtain a provision turning the plant
over to them because they "miscalculated their true interests" on the
basis of "particularly imperfect information." 78 Obviously, if the corpo-
ration had made actual or implied promises to keep the plant open, the
case should have come out differently. 79 But Kennedy's assumption that
75. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.
1980).
76. An example of an opportunistic plant closing would be where a plant owner has several
plants, all of which have workers who have made firm-specific capital investments in the respective
enterprises. Such an employer could attempt to renegotiate all the workers' wages and could close
one of the plants to make his threats to the workers at the surviving plants more credible.
77. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Refer-
ence to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 630 (1982) (court
should have implied such a "conveyance" term in every contract between the company and individ-
ual workers).
78. Id
79. See Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible
Handshake," 52 U. Cmi. L. REV. 903, 939-42 (1985) (arguing that this may have been the case).
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a firm would grant workers ownership rights in the event of insolvency is
preposterous; such an agreement would give workers an incentive to
drive their employers' firms into insolvency. Kennedy's argument has
these additional flaws: (1) he fails to recognize how his proposed legal
rule would affect workers at other firms, and (2) he fails to recognize the
simultaneity-of-performance problems in such cases-problems that sug-
gest workers can protect themselves from opportunistic behavior by ne-
gotiating compensation packages, rather than by lobbying for plant-
closing rules.
On the subject of multifirm effects, David Shapiro has pointed out
that plant-closing rules pose
just one more deterrent to investment in domestic plant and equip-
ment[, which] might lead to a net loss for both employers and employ-
ees. And unless the term were imposed on a nationwide basis, any
state that opted for it might find itself unable to compete for new in-
vestment with other, less creative states. A nationwide rule, of course,
might have a similar effect on our ability to compete with foreign
suppliers.s°
As Shapiro points out, although imposing paternalistic contract terms on
employers might benefit particular workers, such terms harm workers in
other firms, since employers will be less willing to open new facilities if
legislatures or courts prohibit such employers from closing other plants
as the terms of extant contracts allow them to do.
Employers and unions have good reasons to agree that, despite
workers' inability to diversify their firm-specific human capital invest-
ments, employees should share the risk that business failure will lead to a
fundamental corporate change such as merger or bankruptcy. The work-
ers' commitment to success can make or break a firm. Giving workers an
incentive scheme that makes them indifferent to the success or failure of
a firm is irrational.
Kennedy's argument also fails to recognize that, in the event of job-
threatening fundamental corporate changes, workers will generally pre-
fer to receive compensation in the form of wages rather than control of a
plant)" Since workers cannot diversify their capital investments, they
will prefer to receive assets that are not linked to the firms in which they
have already invested so much of their human capital.8 2
80. Shapiro, Cours LegiLazures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 560 (1988).
81. Workers who receive wages can take this money and invest it in firms whose expected
earnings are negatively correlated with the earnings of the firms for which they work, thereby reduc.
ing the risk associated with their firm-specific capital investments. Workers who obtain compensa-
tion in the form of an inalienable property interest in their firm cannot diversify even to this limited
extent.
82. Doemberg & Macey, FSOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 HARv. J. o% LEGIS. 103, 133-36
(1986).
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Similarly, workers and employers who enter into agreements that
require workers to make firm-specific human capital investments face
problems of uncertainty and problems relating to non-simultaneity of
performance.83 These problems suggest that rational workers will not
prefer to receive compensation in the form of property rights in the firm
for which they work. Uncertainty arises because neither workers nor a
firm can be certain of the size of the payoff from workers' human capital
investments. Small investments may result in large increases in the value
of firms; large investments may lead to only negligible payoffs. This un-
certainty gives rise to opportunistic behavior by both sides. Workers are
subject to exploitation both if they are not compensated for their human
capital investments when they make the investments and if the invest-
ments do not produce positive returns. Plant-closing or similar rules that
do not result in payments to corporate employees until they have already
completed their human capital investments do not serve workers' inter-
ests, because such rules subject workers to exploitation during the period
after their investment is complete and before plants are closed.
b. The empirical evidence Consistent with the theoretical argu-
ments presented above, the scant empirical evidence does not support the
argument that labor suffers from hostile takeovers. Brown and Medoff's
study of takeovers in Michigan shows that although employment in firms
involved in acquisitions decreases, wages annually increase. 84
While takeovers do not generally result in a loss of jobs for rank-
and-file workers, some fundamental corporate changes, such as plant
closings, do cost workers their jobs. The question to ask, however, is
whether rules regulating plant closings will result in fewer workers being
hired in the first instance-a harm arguably greater than losses of ex-
isting jobs.85 Unfortunately, measuring the extent to which regulation
such as plant-closing laws diminishes employment is difficult. At least
one state has passed such a law and later let it expire. 6 One reason why
83. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
84. Brown & Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERs:
CAUSES AN.D CoNsEQ NFcES, supra note 70, at 9;, see also Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation
and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. R v. 467, 478 ("spin-off transactions generally do not
result in loss of jobs for rank-and-file employees because new firm owners rarely liquidate subsidiar-
ies and fire the employees").
85. See Shapiro, supra note 80, at 560 (discussing the costs that plant-closing rules may impose
on workers).
86. Eg.. MICH. COMP. LAWS AN.N. § 450.755 (encouraging employers to give notice of deci-
sions to close or relocate) (West 1989) (lapsed. pursuant to id § 450.759(i), July 2, 1984). But see id.
§ 445.601 (unlawful for company to relocate or abandon facility without restoration of benefit and
interest given by city or town); see also California Attorney Discusses Trends in At-Will Employment,
Torts and ADR, DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) No. 52, at A-7 (Mar. 20, 1989) ("[S]tates are looking at
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the plant-closing law may have expired is because such laws may deter
firms from locating plants in a state, tend to increase costs, or increase
the perception of costs, of doing business in a particular locale. This
analysis suggests that plant-closing laws do not benefit workers and casts
suspicion on the recently enacted federal law that requires advance notifi-
cation of plant closings.87
The critical issue raised by these plant-closing laws is not whether
they benefit workers, but whether they benefit workers more than they
harm other groups, particularly shareholders, who have contractual or
quasi-contractual claims on firms' income streams. If such laws do not
benefit workers more than they harm other groups, then workers will
ultimately suffer, because affected firms will hire fewer employees.
There are several reasons to believe that these statutes decrease
shareholders' welfare by more than they increase workers' welfare. A
firm on the brink of failure can sometimes experience an unexpected
turnaround. The probability of such a change of fortune will drop if,
after learning of a plant closing, workers disrupt the firm's activities
when they leave to look for other jobs. In addition, workers as a group
will be absolutely better off without advance notification of a plant clos-
ing if the benefits of notice are lower than the costs, which take the form
of a higher probability that the plant at issue will in fact close.8 Simi-
plant closing legislation.. eighteen plant closing bills were introduced during 1988... and the
trend will continue. Nine states now have laws relating to plant closings and/or plant relocations.").
87. The new law, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2102) requires that, under virtually all condi-
tions, firms with 100 or more workers give workers and communities 60 days' notice prior to closing
a plant. The bill requires that workers be paid for every day that they are deprived of notice,
although the bill provides exceptions for businesses struck by unforeseen circumstances and busi-
nesses in dire financial straits. See Wehr, Reagan Bows to Politics on Plant-Closing Bil 46 CoNG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2216, 2216 (1988).
88. A simple hypothetical clarifies this point. Suppose a firm has 10 workers. If the workers
are not given 60 days' notice of a proposed plant closing, a 10% chance exists that the firm will
remain open for an additional 12 months. The present value of the 10 workers' combined salary for
that 12-month period is S250,000, or 525,000 per worker. This $250,000 sum must be multiplied by
the 10% probability of receiving that amount to obtain the value to the workers of not being notified
of the proposed plant closing. The value to the workers is 525,000 (S250,000 X .10), or S2500 per
worker. If the workers are given 60 days' notice, however, the probability of the plant ultimately
closing declines fiom 10% to 5% because of the costs associated with workers seeking new jobs and
leaving prematurely. Thus, the expected value of the chance that the firm will remain open for an
additional 12 months declines to S12,500 (S250,000 X .05), or S1250 per worker. Under these
circumstances, a plant-closing law will cost workers S1250 (S2500 minus 51250). This cost will be
offset to the extent that some workers start new jobs within the 60-day period, but the workers would
not be irrational if they agreed to decline to receive advance notice of a plant closing if declining
notice would reduce the probability that the firm would close.
Under this hypothetical, after the workers learn of a plant closing, they face a collective-action
problem akin to a prisoner's dilemma. Cf Wiley, Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the
Pdsonerls Dilemma, 86 MIcH. L REv. 1906, 1915-16 (1988) (explaining prisoner's dilemma). They
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larly, even if it is entirely certain that a plant will close after sixty days,
costs to the firm (such as reduced worker morale and higher absenteeism)
may exceed the benefits to workers. This comparison of costs suggests
that if workers could "sell" their entitlement to plant-closing notification
back to firms, workers might come out ahead.
Finally, the new federal plant-closing law may harm workers by in-
creasing the marginal value of locating plants overseas, beyond the reach
of such laws. This law may not affect the behavior of many domestic
corporations, since for most domestic firms the cost/benefit calculation
about whether to locate a plant overseas is so clear-cut that the plant-
closing law will not be a decisive factor. The rule will, however, have a
greater effect on foreign firms that are indifferent between opening a new
plant in the United States or opening it elsewhere. This effect stems not
only from the direct costs of the new law, but also because passage of the
law sends a signal that the U.S. government tends to pass laws that re-
strict firms' freedom of action.
HI. FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES: THE INTERESTS OF
OurSIDE GROUPS
Part II has shown that, despite the firm-specific capital investments
of bondholders, managers, customers, suppliers, and rank-and-file work-
ers, fundamental corporate changes do not harm these groups, because of
their ability to contract in response to the problems posed by fundamen-
tal corporate changes. Those outside the web of contracts that make up
modern, publicly held firms may be in a weaker position to protect them-
selves from exploitation than fixed claimants. This part of the Article
considers their interests.-
When U.S. Steel decided to close its plants in Youngstown, Ohio,
the United Steel Workers claimed that the closings were prohibited be-
cause "a property right [had] arisen from the long-established relation
between the community of the 19th Congressional District and Plaintiffs
[the United Steel Workers] on the one hand, and Defendant [U.S. Steel],
on the other." 89 The Sixth Circuit expressed sympathy for this posi-
tion,9° but declined to grant a new property interest to the community;
might be better off as a group by agreeing to refrain from disrupting their work by searching for new
jobs, but as individuals they clearly are better off if they can find a new job equivalent to their old
ones. Thus, agreeing not to be notified of a plant closing may benefit workers by mitigating the
collective-action problem they face when they receive notification.
89. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp, 631 F.2d 1264, 1280 (6th
Cir. 1980) (citing plaintiff's complaint).
90. Id. The Sixth Circuit also quoted the district judge's statement that "United States Steel
should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area after drawing from the lifeblood of the com-
munity for so many years." Id at 1266.
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the court reluctantly concluded that "no authority for such a decision
existed at either the state or national level." 91
Professor Joseph Singer argues vigorously that the Youngstown case
was wrongly decided.92 He claims that the law often recognizes a reli-
ance interest in property and that such an interest supports judicial allo-
cation of a property right to communities and community groups that
act in reliance on a firm's continued operation in their communities. If
accepted, this argument could entitle hospitals, service organizations,
and local governments, which have no preexisting contractual relation-
ship with a firm, to compensation whenever a fundamental corporate
change causes them harm.
The argument has surface plausibility. For one thing, unlike the
individuals and groups discussed in part II, the constituencies that Singer
discusses lack contractual privity with firms undergoing fundamental
corporate changes and may not be able to protect themselves from firms'
opportunistic behavior. Again, the problem is that the relevant commu-
nity groups make firm-specific investments. Corporate employees re-
quire hospitals, churches, and schools, and firms require sewers, roads,
and other capital improvements. But all of these investments are some-
times tailored to particular corporations. A local government might
choose the location of a hospital, for example, to better serve a factory
that has a large number of industrial accidents. If the factory closes, and
the community reconfigures to accommodate a different industry, the
hospital may find itself unable to maintain its level of services. Similarly,
different industries might give rise to different philanthropies. A coal
mining operation might support a black lung clinic, and a brewery might
support an alcohol treatment center. Both the communities and the
firms within them value the firm-specific capital investments that such
service organizations require. If such organizations can be rendered use-
less at the whim of the corporations they support, then people will have
less incentive to establish such organizations, and valuable social services
will go unprovided.
As attractive as legal protection for these noncontracting organiza-
tions might seem, the law should not mandate such protection for at least
three reasons. First, like the imposition of a plant-closing rule, the recog-
nition of such a legal right would decrease investments in plants and
equipment in jurisdictions that recognized such a right. Moreover, busi-
ness firms would hesitate to support or recognize such organizations,
fearing that such support would give rise to reliance interests. This reac-
91. Id
92. Singer, supra note 1, at 621.
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tion would, of course, harm the very people that such a legal rule should
protect.93
Second, these organizations can themselves protect any firm-specific
investments they make. Local governments and philanthropies are un-
likely to make firm-specific investments unless they receive compensation
for them because, like other entities, such organizations have multiple
demands on their resources. Put another way, corporations compete for
the services of philanthropies. This competition results from the fact
that supportive philanthropies and local government agencies enhance
the profitability of the organizations they serve. Their activities can re-
duce firms' direct and indirect labor costs significantly,94 and these bene-
fits force firms who enjoy the services of such philanthropies to deal with
them appropriately. Indeed, these organizations often provide health-re-
lated services and other support that corporations would otherwise feel
compelled to provide. Thus, saying that these organizations have no
contractual relationship with the firms they serve is misleading. The con-
tractual relationship may be informal, but it exists nonetheless.
Presumably, government entities and philanthropies provide serv-
ices to firms because they can do so most efficiently. For example, gov-
ernments, because of their eminent domain power, are particularly well
suited to providing roads and sewers. In contrast, the similar health care
needs of several local businesses may make it most efficient for one spe-
cialized support organization to serve those businesses. Hospitals appear
to fit this model especially well, because they tend to specialize their
health care services to meet the needs of the communities they serve.
This structure of philanthropic support poses the danger that business
firms enjoying the benefits of such support will free-ride on the generosity
of their neighbors, since philanthropies generally cannot exclude the em-
ployees of firms that do not contribute their share of the cost of support
services being provided. Philanthropic organizations in communities
where many similar industries exist will be especially vulnerable to such
opportunistic behavior. In these communities, pivate hospitals will
price their services to cover their costs, or local governments will estab-
lish public hospitals and tax businesses to avoid free-riding. Where free-
rider problems are not so acute, individual firms might vertically inte-
grate services provided by outside organizations. In sum, philanthropies
will structure themselves to eliminate free-rider and firm-specific capital
93. See Shapiro, supra note 80, at 560.
94. Such organizations reduce employers' direct labor costs by enhancing the quality of life in
the communities in which those employers operate. Employees will be willing to trade direct remu-
neration for improvement in quality of life. They reduce employers' indirect labor costs in a variety
of ways, such as by lowering health care costs and employee absenteeism.
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investment problems, again illustrating how private ordering allows flexi-
ble responses that public regulation cannot provide.
The bargaining that takes place between state and local governments
and business firms that are considering relocation shows how private or-
dering in this area works. Such negotiations often entail the exchange of
specific promises by both parties and demonstrate the degree to which
third parties can deal effectively with the corporations they serve.
The third and perhaps most important reason not to grant property
rights in business firms to local governments and philanthropies is that
such a legal right would lead to opportunistic behavior by the organiza-
tions providing services to corporations. If property rights would enable
these organizations to extract payments from corporations undergoing
fundamental corporate changes, such organizations would have incen-
tives to take actions that would help them "earn" such a property right.
Such opportunistic behavior would harm corporations and workers alike
and would exacerbate the disincentives to initial capital investments that
legal recognition of a reliance interest in philanthropies and local govern-
ments creates. Obviously, not all philanthropies and local governments
would engage in such opportunistic behavior, but some undoubtedly
would. This behavior militates against the creation of a new property
right where none appears needed.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the surface, few issues of corporate law present as appealing a
case for regulatory intervention as the effect of fundamental corporate
changes on non-shareholder constituencies. These changes can pro-
foundly disrupt the lives of everyone connected to the firms that experi-
ence them; indeed, corporate change seems a paradigm of corporate
exploitation of innocent third parties.
This Article has studied the legitimate interests of affected groups-
particularly employees--who, compared to shareholders, appear to bear
a disproportionate share of the costs of fundamental corporate changes
while enjoying few, if any, of the economic benefits of these changes. The
Article has argued that the problems posed by fundamental corporate
changes result from the fact that shareholders can use such changes to
appropriate the firm-specific human capital investments of third parties,
such as managers, workers, suppliers, and customers. The debate about
regulation of fundamental corporate changes thus focuses not on the pos-
sibility of third parties' exploitation, but on the question whether the pri-
vate contracting process can protect such third parties' interests. This
Article has argued not only that private contracting can give this protec-
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tion, but that it generates results that make the affected parties better off
than if their rights were "'protected" by regulatory intervention.
As discussed above, regulatory initiatives that attempt to do more
than simply enforce legitimate private agreements discourage invest-
ments, thus raising capital costs and slowing economic growth. These
rules also prevent private parties from customizing legal rules to meet
their own needs, and force third parties dealing with corporations to ac-
cept a form of compensation or risk-taking that they may find less than
optimal. For example, under a legal regime that "protects" employees
from the effects of fundamental corporate changes, employees who prefer
to obtain additional salary or pension benefits in exchange for statutorily
imposed protections would be made worse off.
Finally, granting non-shareholder constituencies a "reliance" prop-
erty interest in corporate assets would prompt those parties to engage in
strategic behavior in an effort to maximize the probability of acquiring
such a property interest. This strategic behavior would benefit no one,
but would impose costs on corporations and a deadweight welfare loss on
society.
For all of these reasons, the traditional common law rules of corpo-
rate governance, which provide that corporate directors have an exclu-
sive obligation to maximize value for residual claimants and which rely
on the contracting process to protect the legitimate and important inter-
ests of third parties, do not "exploit" non-shareholder constituencies.
Rather, they best serve the interests of society as a whole. Measures that
transfer control over fundamental corporate changes from shareholders
to non-shareholders will injure both shareholders and the other constitu-
encies that such measures seek to benefit. In the end, a straightforward
approach to fundamental corporate change, one that protects the rights
and interests of residual claimants, is still entitled to respect within our
legal system.
